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PHASES OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1936
By WILLIAM D. MORRISON, of the Denver Bar

ECAUSE of the extensive subject to be considered,
I shall attempt to cover only a few of what I believe
to be the more important phases in connection with
the Revenue Act of 1936 as compared with the Act of
1934, as it affects: Individual Normal Tax and Surtax;
Corporation Excess-Profits Tax, Normal Income Tax, and
Surtax on Undistributed Profits, and the Surtax on Corporations Improperly Accumulating Surplus. I shall, with
a few exceptions, omit any reference to the Revenue Act
of 1935. So far as the theory of the Act is concerned, no
change has taken place; however, there is a pronounced
change in the procedure and the method of calculating the tax,
and a material change in the rates particularly with respect to
corporations. Regardless of many opinions and views expressed with reference to the Act of 1936, it was approved
June 22, 1936; and it is necessary to proceed under its provisions, as it is effective for the 1936 calendar year and any
fiscal year beginning after January 1, this year.
INDIVIDUALS-NORMAL INCOME TAX

The normal income tax rates, applicable to individuals
under the Laws of 1934 and 1936, are unchanged. The
personal exemption remains the same; that is, a single person
has an exemption of $1,000.00, the head of a family or
married person has a personal exemption of $2,500.00, and
no change has been made with reference to the credit of
$400.00 for each dependent person. The earned income
credit, minimum and maximum, continues as under the prior
Act. While the rate remains the same, the provision in the
Act of 1936 as to the taxable income has been altered. Under
the 1934, and prior acts, dividends were not subject to normal income tax to the shareholder on the theory that they
had been taxed while in the hands of the corporation, and
to impose a tax thereon would constitute double taxation.
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The 1936 Law imposes a tax on dividends of certain types
received during the taxable year by shareholders, and, when
so paid, constitute taxable income to the recipient and a credit
to the corporation for dividends paid.
Further treatment of dividends will be considered under
the provisions of Corporation Credit for Dividends Paid and
Distributions by Corporations.
INDIVIDUALS--SURTAX

The surtax, under the 1934 and 1936 Acts, is based
on the net income in excess of the personal exemption, and
the credit for dependents. The rate remained the same for
net incomes up to $50,000.00. In the 1934 Act the rate
ranged from 4% upward to 59%, whereas the 1936 Act rate
is from 4% to a maximum of 75%.
CORPORATION-EXCESS-PROFITS TAX

The excess-profits tax now in force was imposed by the
Act of 1935 as amended by the 1936 Act. Under the 1934
Law an excess-profits tax of 5 % was imposed on the corporate net income in excess of 121/% of the adjusted declared
value of entire capital stock as shown in the 1935 Return of
Capital Stock Tax for the year ended June 30, 1935. In
computing the excess-profits tax under the 1936 Act, definite
items of deductions are provided; for example, dividends received by corporations are deductible as a credit for the purpose of this tax to the extent of 85% of their amount. There
is no tax on interest received on obligations of a State, Territory, Municipality, the District of Columbia, or United States
Possessions. The normal income tax is not deductible in
computing net income subject to excess-profits tax for taxable years beginning after January 1, 1936.
After applying the items above mentioned, we arrive
at the figure subject to excess-profits tax. The rates provided
for the computation of this tax are 6% of such portion of
the net income as is in excess of 10% and not in excess of
15 % of the declared value of entire capital stock as shown by
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the 1936 Return of Capital Stock Tax, and 12% of such
portion of the corporation's income as is in excess of 15%
of the declared value of the entire capital stock. As an example, assume a corporation with no dividends from corporations or interest on obligations of states, municipalities, etc.,
which had declared its entire capital stock as $50,000.00 and
had an income subject to this tax of $44,602.27. The first
10% of the declared value of $50,000.00 or $5,000.'00
would be deducted and not subject to tax. The amount of
the declared value between 10% and 15%, or 5% of $50,000.00, or $2,500.00 would be at the rate of 6%. The tax
on this amount would, therefore, be $150.00. The two
items of $5,000.00 and $2,500.00 would constitute 15%
of the declared value. The remainder, deducting these two
items in the aggregate sum of $7,500.00 from the net income
of $44,602.27, would leave $37,102.27. The excess-profits
tax on this amount at the rate of 12% is $4,452.27. The
total excess-profits tax under this example would be the sum
of $150.00, 6% of $2,500.00, and 12% of $37,102.27 or
$4,452.27, a total excess-profits tax of $4,602.27.
The reason for discussing this tax first is, that the 1936
Act provides that the amount of the excess-profits tax paid
or accrued under the Revenue Act of 1935 (as amended) is
deductible in computing the net income of a corporation for
the purpose of both normal tax and surtax on undistributed
profits, and both excess-profits tax and normal tax are deductible before making the computation of the surtax on
undistributed profits. No complications will result in computing the excess-profits tax first, because the net income for
that purpose is computed without deduction of either the
income or surtax on undistributed profits. Apparently excessprofits tax will be deductible from normal tax and surtax at
the end of the calendar: year, 1936, for those corporations only
that are on the accrual basis, as corporations on the cash basis
would not be in a position to determine the amount of said
tax so as to pay it prior to the close of the calendar year. This
applies also to fiscal years ending in 1937 and subsequent taxable years.
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CORPORATIONS-NORMAL TAX

Section 13 of the 1936 Act imposes a normal tax on
corporations with the exception of exempt corporations
which come within Section 101; and banks and trust companies, under Section 104, wherein the rate is 15% instead
of the rate provided by Section 13. Although the normal
tax rate is higher on net taxable incomes up to $40,000.00,
this class of corporations is not subject to the surtax imposed
by Section 14 of the Act. The normal tax, under the 1934
Act, was calculated on a straight line basis of 133/4% of the
taxable net income. Under the 1936 Act, a graduated scale
of taxation is imposed upon the net taxable income; the first
$2,000.00 at the rate of 8%, the next $13,000.00 at the rate
of 11%, the next $25,000.00 at the rate of 13%. This
brings us to a total net income of $40,000.00, and all income
over that figure is subject to a tax at the rate of 15 %.
Let us assume that a corporation had the same income
as was mentioned under the excess-profits tax which is subject to tax under this section; namely, $44,602.27, with no
interest on United States bonds, dividends from corporations,
or interest on obligations of states, municipalities, etc. The
accrued excess-profits tax, it appears, may be deducted providing, as heretofore stated, that the corporation was making
its return on the accrual basis. For example, from the net
income heretofore used, of $44,602.27, the accrued excessprofits tax of $4,602.27 may be deducted leaving a net income
subject to normal tax of $40,000.00. Applying the rates of
8% for the first $2,000.00, 11% for the next $13,000.00,
and 13% for the following $25,000.00, the tax would
amount to $4,840.00. In this example the highest bracket
of the normal tax was not reached, namely the maximum
rate of 15%. Here, as in the excess-profits tax section, corporations may deduct as a credit 851% of dividends received
from corporations subject to income tax. One of the interesting facts in connection with this tax is that where no excessprofits tax is applicable as a deduction before calculating the
corporation's normal tax, the normal tax would be less under
Section 13 of the 1936 Act than under the 1934 Act on
corporations having a net income up to $92,800.00. The

DICTA

normal tax on a net income of $92,800.00 amounts to $12,760.00 under either Act.
CORPORATIONS-SURTAX ON UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS

Authorities on taxation have, for some time, considered
the imposition of a tax on the undistributed profits of a corporation. This part of the Act of 1936 is unique and the
first Act to specifically impose a tax on the undistributed
profits in this country. Some authorities doubt its constitutionality, while others point out the fact that the Sixteenth
Amendment gives Congress the power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes from whatever source derived. Under its administration many difficult problems will arise which will, of
necessity, have to be clarified by judicial determination. This
tax in principle represents a penalty tax upon the profits of
any year in which the corporation does not distribute its
profits to its shareholders. Such a procedure is rather drastic
in that, through the depression period, many corporations
sustained deficits of large amounts, and the law makes no
provision for restoration of these deficits before determining
the tax imposed, and causes the corporations to suffer the
penalty for not making distribution of the taxable years'
earnings. The undistributed profits of a corporation, as a
general rule, are not represented by cash. They may be represented by an increase in assets or a decrease in liabilities, such
as: (1) Notes or Accounts Receivable, (2) Inventories, (3)
Capital Expenditures for the betterment of the plant or equipment, or (4) The Liquidation of Indebtedness.
Many state laws prohibit the making of distribution of
earnings while a deficit exists. Consider for a moment, Section 34, Chapter 41, "Corporations," 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, which reads as follows:
"If the directors, trustees or other officers or agents of any corporation shall declare and pay any dividend when such corporation is insolvent, or any dividend the payment of which would render it insolvent
or would diminish the amount of its capital stock, all directors, trustees,
agents or officers assenting thereto shall be jointly and severally liable
for all debts of such corporation then existing, and for all that shall
thereafter be contracted while the capital remains so diminished."
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Under the provisions of this Section, it would be an exceedingly bad policy for a corporation having a deficit to pay
dividends out of possible or actual profits until the deficit was
eliminated.
The estimated amount of adjusted net income will,
when circumstances permit, be a strong influencing factor in
determining the amount which the corporation will distribute
in dividends. For example, consider a corporation with a
net income subject to normal tax of $40,000.00, that is,
after deducting the excess-profits tax, the normal tax thereon would amount to $4,840.00, leaving the adjusted net
income, subject to surtax, $35,160.00, with no paid dividend
credit. The computation of the surtax on undistributed
profits would be as follows:
Surtax thereon:
First 10 % of adjusted net income
$3,516.00 increased under
specific credit provision to ---$ 5,000.00
Next 10% of adjusted net income 3,516.00

At Rate
Of
7%
12%,

Amount of
Surtax
$ 350.00
421.92

Next 20% of adjusted net income

7,032.00

17%

1,195.44

Next 20% of adjusted net income

7,032.00

22%

1,547.04

12,580.00

27%

3,396.60

Balance of undistributed net in-

come

---------

Total undistributed net income-$35,160.00

Surtax $6,911.00

The surtax under this example is equal to 19.65% of
the undistributed net income, whereas, if a dividend of $30,000.00 had been paid so as to leave the undistributed net
income at $5,160.00, the surtax would have amounted to
$369.20.
Inasmuch as the amount of the surtax on undistributed
profits is directly predicated upon the amount of dividends
paid, and upon the effect of restrictions on certain classes of
dividends, let us turn to a discussion of the new phases it
brings about. In connection with this tax, the government
apparently does not care who pays it so long as it is paid. If
the corporation does not distribute its profits to its shareholders, then it must pay the tax. If the corporation makes
distribution of its profits to the shareholders, then the share-
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holders must pay the tax. In either event additional revenue
is received directly from corporate profits. The decision as
to who shall pay the tax, therefore, lies with the corporation.
Section 115-A. "Definition of Dividend," eliminating
the exceptions, in substance states: "The term, dividend,
when used in this title means any distribution made by a
corporation to its shareholders, whether in money or in other
property, (1) out of its earnings or profits accumulated after
February 28, 1913, or (2) out of the earnings or profits of
the taxable year, without regard to the amount of earnings
and profits at the time the distribution was made."
The regulations, Article 27, 1 (b), reads in part, "When
Dividends are Considered Paid.-A dividend will be considered as paid when it is received by the shareholder. A dividends paid credit cannot be allowed unless the shareholder
receives the dividend during the taxable year for which the
credit is claimed.
If a dividend is paid by check and the check bearing a
date within the taxable year is deposited in the mails, in a
cover properly stamped and addressed to the shareholder at
his last known address, at such time that in the ordinary
handling of the mails the dividend would be received by the
shareholder within the taxable year, a presumption arises
that the dividend was paid to the shareholder in such year."
With reference to corporation credit for dividends paid,
Section 27 divides this subject into the following subdivisions:
(a) Dividends Paid Credit in General.
(b) Dividend Carry-Over.
(c) Dividends in Kind.
(d) Dividends in Obligations of the Corporation.
(e) Taxable Stock Dividends.
(f) Distribution in Liquidation.
(g) Preferential Dividends.
(h) Non-taxable Distributions.
Time will not permit a discussion of each of these subdivisions although there are some items that justify specific
attention.
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If the corporation makes a distribution in the form of
non-taxable stock dividends, it receives no credit for dividends paid, and of course the stockholders pay no tax on
dividends so received. In the case of Koshland v. Helvering,
80 Law. Ed. 845, which was decided during the month of
May this year, the court held that, "Where a stock dividend
gives a stockholder an interest different from that which his
It
former stockholdings represented he receives income."
redividends
that
stock
decision,
would appear, from this
ceived in shares different from those held by the stockholder
constitute taxable income under the Sixteenth Amendment,
and should, therefore, be deductible by the corporation. Under Section 115 (F) (2), where the corporation gives the
shareholder the election as to the medium of payment, that
is, either in cash or stock, and he takes stock, it is a taxable
dividend to the recipient, and the corporation may take credit
for the distribution in arriving at its undistributed profits
surtax.
In addition to the credit allowed in computing the
amount subject to the undistributed profits surtax, for dividends actually paid out within the year, under Section 27, an
additional credit is allowed by Section 26 (C) (1) , consisting
of amounts applied to obligations, covered by a contract
entered into in writing before May 1, 1936, out of current
year earnings, to the extent that the su'rplus at the beginning
of the year was insufficient to pay such obligations, and of a
credit allowed by Section 26 (C) (2), of amounts paid or
set aside out of earnings of the taxable year for the discharge
of a debt, provided the requirement to make such an allocation is contained in a writteri contract executed before May
1, 1936, which contract expressly requires the earnings of the
taxable year be used for the discharge of, or appropriation for,
such debt. If duplicate credits result from these two subsections, 26 (C) (1) and .26 (C) (2), only one, the larger of
such credits, is allowed as a deduction in computing the un,distributed profits surtax. The principle difference is that
under subsection 26 (C) (1), the earning and profits at the
beginning of the taxable year are taken into consideration,
whereas, under 26 (C) (2),,only the profits of the taxable
year are applicable.
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This tax has caused a considerable amount of discussion
as to its alleged unjustness and unfairness. Looking at it
from another angle, let us assume that Congress had imposed
a normal tax at rates sufficiently high to obtain the revenue
which this tax is expected to yield. No material difference
would have resulted so far as the government is concerned.
There is, of course, the argument that a higher normal tax
and no surtax, even though it produces the same revenue,
would have been less complicated than under the present Act.
This is true to a certain extent, although under the surtax
provision there are definite advantages which accrue to the
corporations as they are in a position to satisfy their stockholders by making a distribution of their earnings and the
tax burden falls to the stockholder. Most stockholders
anxiously await dividends from their stock investments; and
where their incomes are small, their tax burden, as individuals,
is of little, if any, consequence.
Corporations on the fiscal year basis, whose year ends
during the year 1936, make their income tax returns pursuant
to the Revenue Act of 1934, therefore, a corporation filing
its return on a fiscal year basis ending November 30, 1936,
will not be subject to the surtax on undistributed profits
until it files its return for the next fiscal year, beginning
December 1, 1936. Inasmuch as corporations in this category
are not subject to the surtax, any distribution of dividends
made prior to the close of its fiscal year ending in 1936, will
not be available as a credit for the undistributed profits tax.
No doubt, between now and the close of the year, December
31, 1936, many corporations on the calendar year basis, will
make a survey of their earnings to the present time as accurately as possible, and estimate their expected earnings for the
remainder of the-year, to determine the most expedient policy
to adopt in declaring and paying dividends during the current
year, so as to obtain the maximum benefit from the dividends
paid as a credit on their undistributed profits tax.
Although surtax on undistributed profits as a general
rule applies to every corporation subject to tax, there are
certain special exemptions, which come under seven separate
classifications as provided in Section 14 (D). The outstand-
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ing exceptions are, banks, insurance companies, and bankrupt
and insolvent corporations.
For the purpose of showing in recapitulated form the
taxes imposed on corporate income under the three subdivisions, that is, the Excess-Profits Tax, Normal Tax, and the
Surtax on the Undistributed Profits (using the examples
heretofore discussed which yield the greatest amount of tax)
the following tabulation is presented:
Net Income as adjusted subject to Excess-Profits Tax .........-$44,602.27
4,602.27
----------.Excess-Profits Tax thereon -..............

-------------Net Income subject to Normal Tax
------------- -Normal Tax thereon

$40,000.00
4,840.00

Adjusted Net Income subject to Surtax on Undistributed
---------- $35,160.00
---------------------------Profits
----6,911.00
-----------Surtax on Undistributed Profits
Remainder after tax

--------------------------------

$28,249.00

These three distinct taxes, calculated on the examples
given, total $16,353.27, and when based on the Net Income
as adjusted, of $44,602.27, are equivalent to a composite per
cent of 36.66% of said income.
SURTAX ON CORPORATIONS IMPROPERLY
ACCUMULATING SURPLUS

With reference to this tax, which is imposed by Section
102 of the Revenue Acts of both 1934 and 1936, there appears to be a general impression that all corporations with
an accumulated surpls are subject to tax under this section,
which is not the case unless the surplus is permitted to
accumulate beyond the reasonable requirements of the business for the purpose of preventing the imposition of a tax
upon the shareholders.
I wish to call particular attention to one of the new
features of the 1936 Act, Section 23 (Q), which provides
that corporations, under certain circumstances, may deduct
contributions, in an amount which does not exceed 5% of
the taxpayer's net income computed without the benefit of
said Section.

HUGH BUTLER-THE TENACIOUS SCOT
By WM. HEDGES ROBINSON, of the Denver Bar
T seemed to the impatient young lawyer that every twist
in the stage road must bring Central City in sight; but
the coach rumbled and rattled over the rough road without seeming to come nearer to the town. Rugged mountains
that grudgingly gave way for the creek and the road, reared
high in every direction. To the boy, there seemed to be no
end either to the jostling or to the road.
Suddenly the coach whipped around a corner and Central City was before him. A sharp sense of disappointment
came over Hugh. Surely this huddled bunch of shacks could
not be the far-famed city.
A long, dusty street on the right side of the gulch, intercepted by a narrow way about three hundred feet long, were
the only thoroughfares. On the left side of the gulch, slabsided houses rested on poles and scaffolding over the mountain
stream. A few stores were crowded together in an incredibly
small space. All buildings were of frame-a perpetual menace of fire. On every side pock-marked mountains pressed
down upon the town.
Hugh climbed down from the stage and registered at the
St. Nicholas hotel. Of that hotel, perhaps the most that can
be said is that board was five dollars a day. Born of a Scottish
mother, Hugh Butler ever rebelled at the prices prevailing at
mining camps. His thrifty nature could never adjust itself
to the fact that in Central City he paid more and received less
for his money than any other place in the world. The
heritage from his mother and that from his father were ever
at war in this mining camp.
From his Irish father, he had inherited a love for beauty.
The tall mountains etched against a sunset sky and the mountains scarred with mines, the calmness of the faraway places
in the hills and the turbulence of the town-never could be
reconciled in his heart. Even this first evening in Central
City, he was deeply conscious of the fact that beauty and
ugliness crowded upon each other here.
He was puzzled equally by the language. Everyone
talked of the amount of "feet" that he had. Butcher, baker,
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candlestick-maker would without the slightest provocation
excitedly describe a claim that he owned, and pull odd pieces of
rock from his pockets. Nearly every citizen in the town carried a specimen. Much of the currency was in the form of
gold dust, claims for footage, or assignments of claims. But
this language now so puzzling to Hugh Butler was to become
to him as familiar as terms of the law; for he was to own
claims, mines, and specimens of his own, and a good many
of his fees would be paid in feet.
All of this was Central City-the most populated, progressive and prosperous place in the State. In fact Central
City was the Colorado metropolis long before the Queen City
of the Plains was anything more than a frontier trading post
with a few stores on Blake Street.
Hugh lost little time in establishing himself. In partnership with a young lawyer, he opened an office on Main
Street under the name of Royle and Butler.
The following year (1864) Hugh Butler was elected to
fill out the unexpired' term as prosecuting attorney for Gilpin
County. He was re-elected, but resigned in 1866 because of
the pressure of his private practice. While prosecuting attorney, he appeared for the people in the case of Paton v. The
People, 1 Colo. 77, which was one of the first criminal cases
to be heard in the territorial Supreme Court. The case involved the right of the City of Black Hawk to regulate and
tax saloons, gambling, and bawdy houses when such a right
had been granted to the county commissioners under an act
of legislature, which in 1861 created the County of Gilpin
and made Central City the county seat.
Illustrative of the private practice which Butler commanded is the fact that he appeared as counsel in twelve of the
nearly three hundred cases reported in the First Colorado. At
this date there were approximately 130 lawyers in the state,
and the number of cases in which Butler appeared is only outdone by Sam E. Browne, whose appearance in the Supreme
Court have outnumbered all other lawyers in this state, and
Alfred Sayre who was later a partner of Butler. It is interesting to note that the first case, Smith v. Cisson (1 Colo. 29)
in which Butler appears as 'counsel in the Supreme Court he
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lost, and that the procedure questions there involved were
again to plague him.
In 1867, he was elected to the upper house of the territorial legislature, and re-elected again when his term expired.
His political career which had begun with the district attorneyship, terminated with the senatorship so far as public holding was concerned. However, he continued to be an active
and aggressive Democrat for many years. In 1876 he was
selected chairman of the state central committee of the Democratic party, managing its first state campaign. Six years later
he ran for state senator from the Denver district and was defeated. With the exception of serving as mayor of Central
City in 1871, Butier held only two political offices, although
in 1882 Governor Grant offered to appoint him as superior
court judge in Denver. Butler refused the appointment because of an extensive and profitable practice.
It was not unusual for his practice to compel him to take
a trip to the East. On one of these trips, Butler met Annie
Thatcher Machie, daughter of John Milton Thatcher of Kentucky and widow of Charles M. Machie. They were married
on February 13, 1872, and their life together was one of rare
devotion. No children were born of this marriage, and when
Butler died on June 27, 1912, he left no surviving relations
in America, his wife having died several years before.
His marriage marks a turn in Butler's life. So far his
practice had been the rough and ready practice of the frontier
with its self-created laws and procedure. Some stabilization
had begun to enter the law in Colorado, and some of the
causes for its roughness had begun to disappear. When international financiers began to manipulate silver, they destroyed
the towns of Central City, Black Hawk, and a hundred other
silver mining towns. They wiped out the picturesqueness of
the Teller House, the Opera House, and the Barton House
within whose walls such personages as General Sheridan, Jefferson Davis, Jay Gould, Baron Rothschild, Count Turenne,
Lord Dunraven and others had stayed. Partly because of
this changing scene, partly because Mrs. Butler wished to be
near her brother, Joseph Thatcher who was president of the
Denver National Bank, Butler moved to Denver. His removal was the first of a general exodus of lawyers who had
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made the bar of the little Kingdom of Gilpin the most
brilliant of the West.
While not neglecting his mining interests, Butler's practice changed radically. In 1874 he became a member of the
firm of Sayre Zd Wright, changing the name to Sayre, Wright
&$Butler. This firm controlled practically all of the corporate
practice in the state and was frequently referred to as the
"trust."
It numbered among its clients, the First National
Bank, the Colorado National Bank, the Chaffee interests,
Kansas, Pacific and Denver railroads, the gas and the water
company, and the city railway company.
The third and final phase of Butler's life commenced in
1892 when he accepted a professorship in the University of
Colorado Law SchoOl, to teach common law and code pleading. This position he filled with a quiet distinction which a
background founded upon an extensive practice and a philosophy well suited to these subjects permitted him to enjoy.
His Scottish heritage gave him a tenacity which was
frequently illustrated in his trial tactics and his Irish heritage
made him delight in legal legerdemain. One case, which he
ultimately lost and in which he was a principal figure, shows
these traits which made it said of him that if he represented
a defendant, the cause was never tried until both parties were
dead and generally not then.
The facts of the case were that William Linn, owner of
an undivided interest in the American Mine, assigned his interest to Butler and Charles Wright on January 24, 1879, for
certain monies advanced by Butler. The assignment permitted Butler and Wright to enter into possession and to
work the property, paying the debt to themselves out of the
proceeds. It later developed that the Little Sliver and the
American had overlapping claims. This dispute was settled
by transfering practically all of the interest in the American
to the Little Sliver and operating both mines under a general
managership, partially controlled by Butler and Wright. In
the meantime, Lewis C. Rockwell by assignment had secured
Linn's interests and brought an action alleging that Butler
and Wright had defeated the contract by the conveyance to
the Little Sliver and therefore owed the plaintiff $5,000,
which was the balance due for Linn's interest. The suit was

DICTA

commenced in 1884 and brought to the Supreme Court in
1885 (Linn v. Butler, 8 Colo. 355), where it was remanded
to the trial court for further pleading and trial. In the meantime Linn died and in December, 1885, Butler moved for a
dismissal because the action being personal did not survive
Linn. This motion was overruled and in April, 1886, the
defendants filed an answer, after which the plaintiff requested
that the administrator of Linn (David Gage) be joined as
a party plaintiff. The court ruled in January, 1887, that
Gage should be made a party and a trial was had in December
when a verdict was returned for Rockwell. Filing a bond,
Butler appealed to the Supreme Court and the decision was
there affirmed in 1890. (Butler v. Rockwell, 14 Colo. 125.)
Then Butler appealed to the United States Supreme
Court alleging that an act of the state legislature creating
supreme court commissioners to report to the court on referred
cases was unconstitutional; and since the hearing in the state
supreme court had proceeded in this fashion, the decision of
that court was repugnant to the federal constitution. The
United States Supreme Court held that since the federal question was not properly submitted to the state court it would
not rule upon the question. (Butler v. Gage, 138 U. S. 52,
34 Sup. Ct. 869.)
Rockwell then commenced a suit on the bond filed in the
state supreme court; and Butler again defended on the ground
that since the commissioner and not the Supreme Court had
acted, there had been no affirmance of judgment and hence no
right of action on the bond had occurred. This contention
was overruled in 1893 (Butler v. Rockwell, 17 Colo. 290)
and a judgment for $9,008.33 was given but the case remanded for a technical error in the trial court's judgment
relating to the rate of interest. Even after three law suits and
four appeals involving eight years, it is said, that Butler and
Wright never did pay the full judgment, but compromised
for a lesser sum.
Law to Hugh Butler was very much a game which was
played by the rules of procedure and practice. His array of
motions and demurrers in a case was frequently astounding,
and his ingenuity in delaying a case when he represented the
defendant was amazing.

DICTA

Probably no other early Colorado lawyer more cannily
and resourcefully took advantage of the technicalities of the
law. Even among a bar which delighted in the mazes of
common law pleading, Butler was renowned for his barrage
of legal motions.
However, law was not the only subject which engrossed
him. His interests were wide and varied. Shortly after coming to Colorado in 1863 he began to acquire mining properties, many of which involved him personally in litigation,
as for example see Butler v. Hinckley, 17 Colo. 523. He
appeared as counsel in many mining cases, notably that concerning the Bassick mine at Querida in Custer County, which
case was taken to the United States Supreme Court. It would
be difficult to estimate what sums of money he invested in
mining, certainly $20,000 and probably more; but none of
it yielded any great return. It is doubtful if he much more
than broke even in his mining ventures.
He was also engaged in several large real estate adventures, being one of those who platted the Town of Edgewater
on April 22, 1889. He was one of the organizers of the
Miners and Mechanics Institute. He helped create the Fire
Department of Central City, and he held many chairmanships
in civic enterprises.
Because of Butler's interest, the Miners and Mechanics
Institute deserves some further mention in his biography. It
was organized in January, 1867, under a territorial charter
granted by Governor Cummins. A combined library, chautauqua, museum and scientific institute, the association was
very prosperous for the first years of its life. It gathered together 1,000 volumes, and had a large membership which
yearly contributed dues of ten dollars. For several years,
Butler served as chairman of its executive committe, and it
was he who in 1873 informed the Institute that its library
had been sold to the city for $300 for school purposes, thus
announcing the beginning of the end of the Institute whose
buildings were shortly afterwards destroyed in the big fire.
In his seventy-second year, the year of his death, Butler
could proudly review a long and useful life. Educator, lawyer, politician, he brought to each of these a full measure of
distinction. His life was like his speeches without froth or
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pyrotechnic display. As a charter member of the Colorado
Bar Association and of the Denver Club, where he resided
during the final years of his life, as a Mason and Knight
Templar, and as one of the first eight to be admitted to practice in the federal district court in Colorado, Hugh Butler
was regarded as an outstanding lawyer and civil leader of
his day.
Hugh Butler could well be proud of the road that he had
journeyed. It had been a long trip and he bore it well. It
had started in Airdire, Scotland, near Lanarkshire on May
31, 1840, crossed the ocean to Hawesville, Kentucky, thirteen
years later, moved in 1857 to Lewiston, Illinois, where Hugh
taught school for three years and studied law for two more,
then in 1862 led to Chicago for a short time before the long
trek was made to Colorado in the following year. And when
the final journey was made to an unknown destination on
that June evening, Hugh Butler eagerly faced it with the
courage that was his throughout life.
MORE ABOUT ABSTRACTS
Hayes R. Hindry, of the Denver Bar, submits the following:
1214 Marcus Bldg., Prewit, Texas.
MR. ALECK DENTON,
January 4, 1936.
Prewit, Texas.
Dear Sir: I have examined the abstract of title in seven parts cov----------ering the South 236Y2 acres out of Edmonton Survey in
County which you are preparing to buy and herewith render my
opinion.
Don't buy the G ----------- land. It has been my sorrow and
burden to look over several horrible examples of a title examiner's
nightmare, but this alleged title takes the cut glass flyswatter. It is my
private belief that .you couldn't cure the defects in this title if you sued
everyone from the Spanish Government (who started this Mess) on
down to the present possessor of the land, who is there by virtue of a
peculiar instrument optimistically designated by the abstractor as a
"General Warranty Deed."
In the first place, the field notes of the Spanish Grant do not close;
I don't think it is possible to obtain a confirmation grant since the last
unpleasantness in 1898. In the second place, there were nineteen heirs
of the original grantee, and only three of them joined in the execution

of the conveyance unto the next party in this very rusty chain of title,
which is a major defect in the first place. We might rely on limitation
here, except that I am reliably informed that nobody has succeeded in
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living on this land for a period of two years before dying of malnutrition. Laches might help out, but anybody who undertakes to buy land
under a title acquired by la~hes, is setting out like the man who set out
to carry the cat home by the tail-he is going to acquire experience that
will be of great value to him and never grow dim or doubtful.
The land has been sold for taxes eight times in the last forty years.
The last purchaser sued the tax collector a month after he bought it, for
cancellation of the sale on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation.
He doubtless had grounds, but this incident will give you a rough idea
of what kind of muzzle-loading smooth bores have been fritzing the
title. Nobody has ever redeemed on any of these tax sales-glad to be
rid of it, no doubt.
On January 1, 1908, a gentleman who appears suddenly out of
nowhere, by the name of Ellis Gretzberg, executed a quit claim deed,
to one Peter Parkinson.
containing a general warranty of title (!)
Parkinson, the prolific old billygoat, dies, leaving two wives and seventeen children, the legitimacy of two of them being severly contested.
I am not being funnier than the circumstances indicate. He actually left
two wives and it appears never to have ben legally adjudicated who he
done wrong by. Each one of the ladies passed away in the Fear of God
and the Hope-of-a Glorious Resurrection and left a will devising this
land to her respective brats. A shooting match between the two sets
of claimants seems to have assisted the title slightly by reducing their
number to six and substituting eleven sets of descendants. One of the
prevalent causes of defect in this title seems to be the amorous proclivities
and utter disregard of consequence prevailing in this neighborhood.
Your prospective vendor derives title by virtue of an instrument
concerning which I have previously remarked. It is executed by a fair
majority of one set of Peter (Prolific) Parkinson, and is acknowledged
in a manner sufficient to pass a County Clerk with his fee prepaid.
Outside of the fact that it does not exactly describe the property
under search, the habendum clause is unto the grantors, the covenant of
general warranty does not warrant a thing, and it is acknowledged
before it is dated,-I suppose it is all right.
I might mention that this land was the subject of trespass to try
title suit between two parties who appear in the abstract for the first time
and one of them recovered judgment awarding title and possession. We
may waiver this as a minor defect, comparatively speaking.
I would advise you to keep the abstracts if you can. It is a speaking testimonial to the result of notary publics' drawing instruments,
county clerks who would put a menu on record if a fee was tendered,
and jacklegged jugheads posing as lawyers.
You can buy the land if you wish. There are at least five hundred
and seventy-three people who can give you as good title as your prospective vendor, not counting the heirs of the illegitimate son, Prather
Linken, who died in the penitentiary in 1889.
KRESS L. CAMPEL.
Yours very truly,
P.S. You owe me $200.00 for headache powder.
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WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?
Would probably bring him.
I've often wondered
A lot more cases.
When in court rooms.
Just how many lawyers.
And pretty soon.
He'd be in the money.
Are more interested.
In whatever impression.
In a great big way.
And his friend said:
They may be making.
"Sure!"
Upon spectators.
Than they are in the person.
And wanted to know.
About the case.
Who is on trial.
He was speaking of.
And how many of them.
And the lawyer seemed.
Are more interested.
Not interested.
In building themselves.
And quieted down.
A reputation.
And all I heard.
Than they are in the fate.
Was that his client.
Of the unlucky fellow.
Was in jail somewhere.
Whom they defend.
And how it happens.
And anyway.
I'm airing my views.
In a couple of minutes.
In this roundabout way.
He was off again.
Is that at a table.
On his big career.
And he was a young lawyer.
Right next to me.
There sat a lawyer.
And I wanted to tell him.
That the way to win.
Who in a voice.
I could plainly bear.
Was to keep uppermost.
His client's interests.
Was telling a friend.
And forget himself.
How lucky he was.
But as an eavesdropper.
That he'd been engaged.
I couldn't do that.
In a criminal case.
For there might have been trouble.
That promised to bring him.
And he'd call the headwaiter.
Much publicity.
And have me removed.
And how it was.
I thank you.
That publicity.
(By K.C.B., "Miniatures of Life" Column, in Hollywood CitizenNews)
A Connecticut state law makes it illegal for a man to shave himself on Sunday.
A Bellingham, Wash., law provides that a woman must not take
more than three steps backward at a time when dancing.
Beer v. Beer, 52 Ohio App. 276. Negligence. Motor Vehicles,
etc. (You're wrong! The point at issue was what constituted a
guest.)
A Pennsylvania law makes it possible for a non-citizen to own
realty, but not a dog.

FIRE INSURANCE-CANCELLATION-AUTHORITY OF AGENT-ESTOPPEL--SUBSTITUTED POLICY-Royal Exchange Assurance of Lon-

don vs. Luttrell et al.-No. 13759-Decided March 30, 1936Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiff Luttrell, desiring insurance against loss by fire in the sum
of $20,200 on property situated in Craig, Colorado, requested one Leroy
Tucker, a local agent, to insure the property. Tucker procured various
policies aggregating this amount in various companies, one of which
was the defendant, Royal Exchange Assurance of London. Policies were
issued and premiums paid. On March 2, 1934, defendant insurance
company notified its local agent in Denver it desired cancellation of its
policy and policy was then arranged for in another company to be substituted for the policy of the defendant company which was cancelled.
The insured did not get the letter from the local agent in regard to the
cancellation of the policy and asking for its return until the day following the fire loss. On the following day the plaintiff returned the policy
to the local agent presumably for cancellation. Later the plaintiff made
proof of loss against all the companies, including the substitute company. Judgment was entered against defendant insurance company
below.
1. The agent, when notified of defendant insurance company's
request for cancellation of its policy, procured the issuance of a substitute policy from the same agent who issued defendant's policy. He,
therefore, was clearly acting as the agent for the insured and not the
insurer.
2. When an agent requests an insurance company, which he does
not represent, to place insurance on certain property, he acts for the
property owner in that transaction.
3. The acts of the agent in waiving the five day notice to the
plaintiff and procuring the substitute policy were ratified by the plaintiff when he returned defendant's policy and retained the one substituted
therefor.
4. The plaintiff was protected to the full amount of insurance
requested and by his pleadings estopped from asserting the voiding of
the substituted policy, validity of which depends upon the cancellation
of the first.
5. Plaintiff could not, through his agent, return the original
policy for cancellation, accept the substituted policy, claim benefits therefrom, and at the same time repudiate the purpose for which the new
policy was issued.--Judgment reversed.
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INSURANCE-DEATH BENEFIT-FAMILY INSURANCE-PAYMENT OF
PREMIUM; RECEIPT AFTER DEATH-ESTOPPEL-International

Service Union Company vs. Mascarenas-No. 14026-Decided
October 19, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice
Burke and Mr. Justice Butler concur.
Action by wife on a death certificate which insures all the immediate members of a family. On the death of any member of the family,
but as to one member only, the company undertakes to pay a sum
determinable from a schedule set forth in the body of the certificate,
the age of the deceased member being the deciding factor. The premium
was due on the 9th day of each month; but although sometimes belated, with exception of the one due in October, 1935, all payments
were made and received without question. On October 11, 1935, the
wife sent the company, by mail, the premium in currency, which,
as claimed, should have reached the company before noon the following
day. About noon, on the 12th, the husband suddenly and unexpectedly, while in a distant county, departed this life. The company's
receipt is dated October 14, 1935. The company still retains the
premium.
HELD: 1. Where the insurance certificate specifically provides
that "Any payment accepted after expiration of the grace period shall
reinstate certificate," and it appears that the premium was sent to the
company prior to the death of the insured, although after the grace
period expired, and the company received the premium and retained it
after learning of the death of the insured, the company is estopped to
deny liability. "It has been held that rule applies when concededly
the insured was dead when the premium was paid."
2. Insurance certificate interpreted and found to provide for the
payment of death benefits on the death of one member of the family
only.--Judgment affirmed.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION-PLEADING--MOTION TO STRIKE

-- Silver State Building and Loan Association vs. Austin-No.
13551-Decided October 5, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Bouck.
Austin and wife sued the Silver State Building and Loan Association to recover on a written contract. Plaintiff's motion for judgment
on the pleadings was granted and judgment entered.
1. The court below erred in striking that portion of the answer
which alleged facts to show that instead of a relationship of debtor and
creditor existed as claimed in the complaint, that the relationship of
stockholder in a building and loan association was the status of the
plaintiffs and governed by the statutes, by-laws of the association and
notice of withdrawal filed by the plaintiffs.--Judgment reversed with
directions.
Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.
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USURY-BILLS AND NOTES-PLEADING--MONEY LENDER ACT OF
1913, 1917, 1919 AND 1935-Waddell, et al. vs. Traylor-No.

13979-Decided October 5, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Young.
A judgment against defendant for unpaid balance of promissory
note was entered below. Their first defense was that they had paid
more than sufficient to satisfy the note if only lawful interest had been
charged. Their second defense was that upon the execution of a former
note for $375, of which the note in suit was a renewal, they only received $300 and that $75 thereof was for additional interest or compensation for the use of the borrowed money and therefore unlawful.
Their third defense was that the lender was subject to Money Lenders
Act of 1917 and he failed to comply therewith. Their fourth defense
was that the interest charged was unconscionable and oppressive. The
court below sustained plaintiff's demurrer to the second, third and fourth
defense.
1. It has formerly been held that the Money Lenders Act of
1919 was unconstitutional. The attempted repeal by this act of the
Money Lenders Act of 1913 and 1917 was ineffectual, but said acts
were finally repealed in 1935, before the complaint herein was filed.
2. The 191.3 act had a sufficiently broad title to include a provision concerning interest on money loaned and the act was constitutional.
3. The provision in the act that treble the interest paid, if in
excess of the rate specified, may be recovered by the party paying the
excess and that a violation of the act shall be a misdemeanor was a
declaration of public policy that a note bearing interest in excess of the
specified rate shall be unenforceable.
4. Contracts to perform illegal or criminal acts are void.
5. The note falls within the provision of Chapter 93, Session
Laws 1917, but the act by its title, refers to interest at the rate of 12
per cent or lower, and the title is not broad enough to cover legislation
with reference to interest in excess of 12 per cent.
6. The court below rightfully sustained the demurrer to the third
defense.
7. The court rightfully sustained the demurrer to the fourth
defense.
8. While the act of 1913 was repealed by Chapter 157 of Session
Laws of 1935, which was before the suit was filed, still Section 6519,
C. L. 1921, provided that the repealing of a statute shall .not have the
effect to extinguish any penalty, forfeiture or liability, either civil or
criminal, which shall have been incurred under such statute unless the
repealing act shall so expressly provide, and there was no such provision
in the act of 1935.
9. Therefore the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the

second defense.--Judgment reversed.
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LIQUORS-LICENSE FEES-OLD AGE PENSION FUND-RIGHTS OF
COUNTY AND CITY-The City of Sterling vs. The Board of

County Commissioners of Logan County-No. 13949-Decided
July 27, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
A declaratory judgment was entered below to determine the meaning of certain acts of the General Assembly of 1933 in reference to
liquors and of an ordinance of the City of Sterling as they affect the
conflicting claims of the County and City to beer license fees collected
by the city. The trial court held that they belong to the county.
1. By Section 17, Chapter 45, Session Laws of 1933, it was
provided that one licensed to sell beer in a municipality shall pay the
treasurer thereof the sum of $80 annually in advance and in another
act of 1933 an old age pension fund was created which provided,
among other things, that license fees from the manufacture, sale, distribution or gift of beer collected by the State, counties and municipalities shall be a part of the old age pension funds. Another provision
provided that 50%o of the monies collected by a municipality from
the same source should be turned over to the county pension fund.
The City of Sterling by ordinance levied annual license fee of $80
from the sale of beer. It further provided that license fees should be
paid into the general fund of the municipality.
2. The State by the act of April 5, 1933, required those engaged
in selling beer in municipalities to pay $80 annually as license fees, all
of which under the act of July 28, 1933, was appropriated to county
old age pension funds.
3.
The city should be required to account to the county for all
of such $80 license fee and not 50% thereof.
4. The money claimed by the County arose from exactions imposed on beer veneers by statute, and which the City, regardless of
its ordinance, was bound to collect and account for as the General
Assembly had directed.
5. Where the city collected nothing from beer venders in excess
of statutory amount, there was no beer license fund which could be
retained in its treasury and credited to the general fund for the use of
the city.-Judgment affirmed.
et al. vs. MANLEY, et al.-No.
13927-Decided July 28, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Plaintiffs below are owners and operators of a coal mine near
Canon City. They transport coal to Canon City for delivery to their
customers and for re-sale, using a ton and one-half truck. In making
deliveries they use the public highways of the state. Plaintiffs brought
suit to enjoin defendants from enforcing Chapter 167, Session Laws
1935. The district court overruled a general demurrer and defendants elected to stand on their demurrer'and injunction relief was granted.
THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION,
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1. The act does not delegate to the Utilities Commission legislative functions.
2. The act does not confer upon the commission judicial functions.
3. The act is not unjustly or unreasonably discriminating in
exempting commercial carriers by motor vehicle of farm products and
live stock.
4. The act is regulatory in character and not primarily for the
raising of revenue ar'd therefore not void because originating in the
senate instead of the house.
5. The act which levied a tax of three mills per ton mile on
persons transporting on the public highways their own property for
sale is not confiscatory in the absence of evidence so showing where it
appears by other acts that common carriers and private carriers for
hire are taxed .05c per ton mile for use-of the highways.-Judgment
reversed.
Mr. Justice Holland dissents. Mr. Justice Campbell and Mr.
Justice Hilliard not participating.

ALIENS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS-HUNTING WILD GAME-The People vs. Nakamura-No. 13974-

Decided September 28, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Under section 6882, Compiled Laws of 1921, information containing two counts was filed against Nakamura, an unnaturalized
foreign-born resident in the first count with unlawful possession of
three pheasants, and in the second count with unlawful possession of
firearms, to-wit, "One shotgun, for the purpose of hunting wild game."
A plea of guilty was entered as to the first count, and he was fined'$90
and costs. His motion to quash the second count was sustained by
the court on the ground that section 6882 is unconstitutional under
sections 13 and 27 of article II of the Constitution. Nakamura was
discharged and the people assign error.
1. It is a valid exercise of the police power for the legislature
to prohibit unnaturalized foreign-born residents from hunting or killing
wild game of the state, and in the exercise of such power it may distinguish between citizens of the state and aliens, and it follows that
such portion of the act in question as is directed to this end is constitutional, but in so far as it denies the right of the unnaturalized
foreign-born residents to keep and bear arms that may be used in
defense of persons or property, it contravenes the constitutional guaranty and therefore is void.
2. The defendant's motion to quash the second count of the
information was properly sustained.-Mr. Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Bouck dissent.-Mr. Jlstice Bouck files a dissenting opinion
concurred in by Mr. Justice Burke.
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SOCIETIES--SUICIDE CLAUSE-Neighbors

of Woodcraft vs. Whetstine, et al.-No. 13762-Decided September 28, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Whetstine recovered below on a benefit certificate issued by the
Neighbors of Woodcraft, a fraternal insurance company. The certificate was for death benefit of $2100 and contained a provision for
payment of one-half the principal only in the event of death by suicide.
It was admitted that the insured committed suicide and the society
paid one-half of the certificate and this suit was for the unpaid half
of the principal sum on the theory that the society was not exempt
from the provisions of the Colorado insurance laws to the effect that
suicide shall not be a defense against the payment of life insurance
policies after the first policy year.
1. At the time the certificate was issued, both the certificate and
the by-laws provided that in the event of death by suicide the company
was not liable for more than one-half of the face amount of the certificate.
2. Section 2532, Compiled Laws of 1921, as amended, which
provides that the suicide of a policy holder after the first policy year
shall not be a defense against the payment of the life insurance policy
is not applicable to a society organized as a fraternal or benevolent order.
3. The suicide clause being a part of the general insurance laws
of the State, its provisions cannot be applied to the defense set up by
the society in this case, because neither the suicide provision, nor any
amendments thereto, designate application to fraternal benefit societies,
which the legislature has expressly provided must be done.--Judgment

reversed.
TAXATION----TRUCKS USED FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES-CONSTI-

TUTIONALITY

OF CHAPTER

167, SESSION LAWS 1935-The

Public Utilities Commission, et al. vs. Manley, et al.-No. 13927
-Decided July 28, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Plaintiffs below are owners and operators of a coal mine near
Canon City. They transport coal to Canon City for delivery to
their customers and for re-sale, using a ton and one-half truck. In
making deliveries they use the public highways of the state. Plaintiffs
brought suit to enjoin defendants from enforcing Chapter 167, Session
Laws 1935. The District Court overruled a general demurrer and
defendants elected to stand on their demurrer and injunction relief was
granted.
1. The act does not delegate to the Utilities Commission legislative functions.
2. The act does not confer upon the commission judicial functions.
3. The act is not unjustly or unreasonably discriminating in

exempting commercial carriers by.motor vehicle. of farm products and.
live stock.
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4. The act is regulatory in character and not primarily for the
raising of revenue and therefore not void because originating in the
Senate instead of the house.
5. The act which levied a tax of three mills per ton mile on persons transporting on the public highways their own property for sale
is not confiscatory in the absence of evidence so showing where it appears by other acts that common carriers and private carriers for hire
are taxed .05c per ton mile for use of the highways.--Judgment re-

versed.
Mr. Justice Holland dissents.
Justice Hilliard not participating.

Mr. Justice Campbell and Mr.

CONTRACTS--SURETIES-CONSIDERATION-INSTRUCTIONS

-

Raw-

leigh Company v. Dickneite, Roberts, et al.-No. 13704-Decided October 19, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Butler and Mr. Justic Hilliardconcur.
Plaintiff in error sued defendants in error as sureties on its contract with B. The contract provided that plaintiff in error would sell
its products to B, who agreed to pay therefor and also to pay balance
due under all former contracts. The defendants in error guaranteed
payments thereunder, and also agreed to assume and pay all prior
indebtedness due and owing the plaintiff in error on the date of acceptance of contract and for all merchandise previously sold B, provided
the credit liability shall not exceed $1400. This was the third contract of a series, each succeeding one being a renewal of the preceding.
When the last contract was accepted, B's indebtedness under the former
was $1388. When suit was instituted, the balance due and sued for
was $1381.12. The first item purchased was on May 20, 1931, and
the last April 25, 1933. In 1933 debits and credits appeared at
intervals between January 10 and April 25.
HELD: 1. An instruction that the defendants in error were
liable for the amounts due from B at the time the contract was executed,
plus goods sold thereafter, less payments, should have been given.
2. An instruction that if the contract was entered into and based
upon a valid consideration which was carried out, the verdict should be
for the plaintiff in error in the sum of $1381.12, was defective in
that it failed to state that surrender of prior contracts constituted such
a consideration. This was a matter of law.
3. A pre-existing liability is a good consideration for a new
promise. Consideration need not be in writing. It may be proved
by parol or inferred. A written instrument purports consideration.
Where a consideration is recited an additional one may be proved.Judgment reversed with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff in
error.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION--CONTRACT MADE OUTSIDE STATEWORK AND INJURY OCCURRING IN COLORADo-United States

Fidelity & Guaranty Company, et al. vs. Industrial Commission,
et al.-No. 13988-Decided October 19, 1936--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
Vaughn was the employer and Lipe was the employee. Lipe
was injured while drilling an oil well at Craig, Colorado, and was
awarded compensation for one year at $14 a week for temporary disability and 139 weeks thereafter at same rate for permanent disability.
Lipe's contract for employment was made in Texas and largely
performed there. His work in Colorado extended only to drilling
of one well. Vaughn took out insurance covering his Colorado operations. The insurance carrier admitted liability and paid thereunder
$7.69 a week. Then Lipe filed his claim under the Texas act and
advised he would accept, no more payments under Colorado act.
Nine months thereafter Lipe advised the Commission he had failed to
establish his claim in Texas and then again proceeded under the
Colorado act.
1. To justify recovery under the Colorado act a substantial
portion of the work must be done in this state and with this must be
combined either an accident in Colorado or a contract in Colorado.
2. Add to this the facts that employer and employee otherwise
came within the Colorado act and the accident was covered by the
insurance carrier, the Commission in Colorado had jurisdiction.
3. There was sufficient evidence to support holding that temporary disability ended December 6, 1934.-Judment affirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COMMON

LAW TRUST-LIABILITY-

AGENCY-Rhodes, et al. vs. Industrial Commission, et al.-No.
13929-DecidedOctober 5, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Henderson was killed by a rock slide while placer mining on
property owned by a common law trust, which carried no insurance.
The commission awarded compensation to his widow, and the District
Court sustained the award.
1. Where the trust appeared by counsel in all proceeding below,
it is too late to raise the question that it was not properly made a party,
for the first time in the Supreme Court.
2. Agency may be established by the conduct of the principal
and the alleged agent.
3. Evidence examined and held sufficient to establish that the
trust was an employer of deceased within the meaning of Section 4423,
Colorado Law of 1921.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell, Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice
Holland dissent.
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LIFE

INSURANCE-ACCIDENTAL

DEATH-DOUBLE

INDEMNITY-

Kansas City Life Insurance Company vs. Pettit-No. 13730Decided October 5, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Widow of Pettit brought suit to recover an additional indemnity
on life insurance policy. Plaintiff recovered below.
1. The policy provided that if death of insured occurred from
effects of an accident within the premium paying period and within
90 days from the happening of the accident, double indemnity would
be paid.
2. Where such accident and death occurred two years after the
policy had become a paid up policy, such accident and death did not
occur within the premium paying period, as no premiums were either
due or payable. The premium paying period had ceased, hence double
indemnity was not recoverable.--Judgment reversed.
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